

























MATERIALITY, AFFECT, AND THE 
AESTHETIC IMAGE 
Estelle Barrett 
In this chapter I will examine how art practice and aesthetic experience operate as a 
mode of knowledge production that is rooted in material and subjective processes 
and how this articulates the epistemological dimension of what is referred to in the 
title of this volume as the "new materialism". 
The notion of artistic practice as a mode of enquiry and knowledge production 
constitutes a challenge to assumptions that underpin the privileging of the science 
in the knowledge economy. Drawing on the work of Julia Kristeva, John Dewey 
and Antonio Demasio, I will first examine the material and experiential dimensions 
of creative production that give rise to what I call the "aesthetic image", a struc-
tural aspect of the artwork that emerges as an outcome of the grafting of affect 
to the symbolic through artistic practice. Unlike images that operate via established 
symbolic codes and that serve to communicate information, the aesthetic image is 
"performative"; it emerges through sensory processes and gives rise to multiplicity, 
ambiguity and indeterminacy. Out of this, meanings that fall beyond the codes of 
a given sign system (visual or verbal) may be accessed. This will be demonstrated in 
my analysis of two creative arts research projects at the end of this chapter. First, 
however, I will examine the notion of "performativity", its relation to the emergence 
of the aesthetic image and how this furthers our understanding of the "new materi-
alism" as a critique of science. 
The Problem with Science 
Canonical social science and humanities research has tended to privilege assump-
tions about research and research training derived from science and the idea that 
distanced, impersonal observation is the only reliable method for the production 
of "truths" or knowledge about the world. However, more recently there has been 
a general shift in the arts and humanities toward a second mode of discovery and 
learning, which lain Biggs (2009) describes as a mode of knowledge production that 
emphasizes a context of application, heterogeneity, a reduced reliance on hierarchy 
and an acknowledgement that the production of new knowledge is potentially a 
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trans formative act; that is to say that the production of knowledge is experiential and 
performative. I suggest that in such an approach, distanced observation is replaced 
with aesthetic awareness and knowledge occurs as material process through interac-
tion and action. The key to unlocking this alternative mode of production can be 
understood via Julia Kristeva's account of experience-in-practice and her view of 
creativity as material process that involves a disruption of the established codes of 
language in ways that allow new objects of thought and understanding to emerge. 
Kristeva's critique of science is based on the idea that it is founded on methods 
that were first used capture the truth about nature by classifying and encoding phe-
nomena through a system of formal language that "represses the process pervading 
the body and the subject" (Kristeva 1984: 13). Knowledge in such a framework is 
viewed as static aiild passive. Kristeva has shown that the notion of objective, empiri-
cal observation as a possibility- and truth as universal- cannot hold if we are to take 
accqunt of subjective processes: the interaction between, the body as non-human (as 
matter), embodied experience, language, and thought operating in social contexts. 
The logic of science is a logic that supposes a direct correspondence between 
naming and describing the phenomena to which it refers. This logic presumes that 
the signifier designates the fullness of referent and is flush with the referent. Kristeva 
exposes this logic in her account of proper names, which she describes as abbrevia-
tions of descriptions that describe not particulars, but systems of particulars. Science 
not only abbreviates, but by collecting all the possible descriptions of phenomena 
into its formulae, symbolic representations, concepts and laws, it erases indetermi-
nacy (Kristeva 1986b: 234). Aesthetic experience or art, on the other hand, operates 
through the particulars and indeterminacies of embodied experience-in-practice and 
interaction with objects in the world, bringing into play an alternative logic that the 
logic of the discourse of science forecloses (I<risteva 1986b). My emphasis on "dis-
course" in the previous sentence is deliberate since many scientists have acknowl-
edged that all "real" discoveries in science have come about through processes that 
are ultimately, aesthetic and subjective. Indeed, philosopher and scientist Michael Po-
lanyi asserts that "Complete objectivity as usually attributed to the exact sciences is a 
delusion and in fact a false ideal" (Polanyi 1958: 18). This is so because the subject, 
or the one who observes is, "heterogeneous" - both a subject of rational thought 
and the symbolic as well as of biological processes (I<risteva 1984). 
Artistic practice is often motivated by emotional, personal and subjective con-
cerns; it proceeds not only on the basis of explicit and exact knowledge, but also 
on tacit and experiential knowledge. Experience operates within in the domain of 
the aesthetic; knowledge produced through aesthetic experience is always contextual 
and situated since it involves direct sensory engagement with objects in the world. 
Artistic experience therefore, occurs as a continuum with normal processes of living 
and is derived from an impulse to handle objects and to think and feel through their 
handling. What emerges from this process is the aesthetic image - an image that is 
heterogeneous in ·that it permits a knowing that exceeds what can be captured by the 
symbolic. 
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Kristeva's ideas on the relationship between biological processes, affect and lan-
guage help us to understand that thinking is predicated on our material experiences 
and interaction with the world. Her account of materiality acknowledges that matter 
itself is not static or mute, but is in constant interaction and intra-action with the 
living organism resulting in causal and diff~rential production. Thinking emerges 
through signs and symbols that stand in for the things that were matetialjy and emo-
tionally felt or experienced (Kristeva 1984). Affect and sensation give rise to internal 
images that are forged through encounters with objects in the world; these images 
that are born of aesthetic experience, occur prior to the emergence of signs and 
symbols. In this sense, thought and ·language can be said to have an aesthetic and 
material dimension. This dimension is often masked in everyday communication 
because such communication is reductive, operating through cocks that fix meanings 
or confine them to the rules of the system. 
The Heterogeneous Subject 
Kristeva's account of the "speaking subject" (Kristeva 1986a) as heterogeneous, allows 
us to conceive of a layering of subjectivity that emerges through material process 
and contradiction. She tells us that experience-in-practice puts the subject in "pro-
cess/ on trial", a condition in which subjective responses are predominantly deter-
mined by biological processes and drives so that an alternative logic is at work. This 
is the logic of material process and of the unconscious where there is "no time" in 
the sense of linear temporality, and where the binaries and contradictions of the 
symbolic do not hold. The knowledge or reality brought about by direct experience 
is then, an "a-signijJing apprehension of a new heterogeneous object" (I<risteva 1984: 
202). In creative practice the subject can be viewed as a passageway where there is a 
struggle between conflicting tendencies or drives in response to external stimuli and 
matter as it is felt. Moments of resolution or stases are rooted in affective relations 
- the positive or negative values that emerge through the encounter with objects 
in the world. This point is crucial to understanding why and how I<risteva places 
the subject and forms of subjective agency, rather than mechanistic or automatic 
processes at the core of revolutionary practice. The key term is "affect" - positive 
and negative affects - that originate in pleasure and displeasure. The centrality of 
the subject and human agency in meaning- making processes does not negate the 
agency of objects. Drawing on Sigmund Freud, I<risteva explains that pleasure can 
be understood as the removal or absence of displeasure. There is a constant struggle 
between the drive-ridden processes of the Id, the pleasure principle and the Ego, the 
reality principle. Negativity and rejection, aspects of the living organism's response 
to encounters with objects and material forces give rise to sensation. Accompany-
ing raw sensation is affect experienced first as fluctuating intensities. On the basis of 
pleasure or displeasure, these take on positive or negative valency and (;:merge as feel-
ings that attribute value(s) or that "color" conscious meanings once they are grafted 
to the symbolic. Hence, the aesthetic image emerges: first as the a result of the flow 
material forces that occur through the organism's interaction and intra-action with 
the world, and subsequently as coalescing of subjectivity according to the pleasures 
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and displeasures of encounters with objects in the world; the aesthetic image is not 
the artwork per se, but a materialization of the object as it is felt and a structuring of 
symbolic elements in ways that disrupt customary codes. Kristevan psychoanalysis 
provides an account of thought/language, subjectivity and meaning making as an 
infinite dialectic - material process that involves a two-way movement between matter, 
biological processes and discourse. The subject as biological organism, capable of 
thought and language, is a "filter" through which objects and matter pass as raw sen-
sation and are then transubstantiated, if you like, into language. 
Antonio Damasio's account of the relationship between biological processes, 
emotion feeling and conscious or discursive knowledge in his work, The Feeling rf 
What Happens: Botjy and Emotion in the Making rf Consciousness (1999), is also useful 
here. Although culture and learning may shape the emergence and expression of 
emotions, emotions intrinsically constitute an embodiment of the logic of survival. 
They are dependent on brain devices laid down through the evolutionary process 
and emerge from homeostatic processes that regulate and maintain the efficient 
functioning of living organisms. Damasio's explanation demonstrates how such 
processes are inchoate precursors of conscious thought and language. Dispositional 
arrangements for the regulation of internal states and that maintain the organisms 
boundary and living processes - what Damasio refers s to as core consciousness - are 
biological antecedents of a sense of self (Damasio 1999: 136). Emotions are com-
plicated collections of chemical and neural responses, which can be triggered by 
transient changes in the internal and external milieu. Internal states, which occur 
naturally along a continuum of pain and pleasure, become the unwitting non-verbal 
signifiers of goodness or badness relative to the organism's inherent values. Sensory 
patterns that constitute emotions can be induced non-consciously, but may nev-
ertheless result in particular affects and responses. What we often think of, as the 
intuitive or non-verbal dimension of aesthetic experience and practice may be more 
readily understood through Damasio's elaboration of emotion. Emotions form the 
substrate of bodily representations, neural patterns and images, which may evolve 
as feeling and subsequently, as conscious thought. Indeed, emotions together with 
other processes of core consciousness may be understood as non-languaged maps 
of related events that follow the logic of narrative (Damasio 1999: 184). Hence we 
may argue that affect is "knowing" differently coded. Creative practice allows us to 
access such codes via the aesthetic image and to make visible knowledge that every-
day use of language and discourse hide. 
Experiential Knowledge and the Aesthetic Image 
John Dewey contends that knowledge is by definition experiential, whether it emerg-
es from art or from science. In illustrating the link between materiality, experience 
and knowledge, Dewey's thinking, like that of I<risteva, broadens our understanding 
of the value of the artistic product beyond the confines of traditional aesthetics. 
He tells us that knowledge, gained by the artist through everyday living and activi-
ty, is captured in the artwork or aesthetic image through creative practice. Though 
more intensified, the process of artistic enquiry can be likened to what is described 
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by Dewey as:the flow of experience that runs its course to closure or fulfillment 
through processes of adjustment to our environment and objects in the world. In 
artistic experience, as in everyday experience, "action, feeling and meaning are one" 
(Dewey 1980: 35). Experience involves interaction as a response to discord or lack 
of adjustment. In the flow of experience occurring in the everyday, or in artistic 
practice, a problem can be said to emerge when there is a lack or absence of ad-
justment to surroundings. Initially, such experiences are aesthetic, since they involve 
sensory responses that are then qualified with emotion, a process by which positive 
or negative value is attributed to experience. 
Scientific knowledge, which is predicated on description or naming, can only con-
stitute partial truth about reality. The artwork or aesthetic image ruptures and trans-
gresses the rules and codes upon which naming or the fixing of meaning relies. Its 
structure or style is polyvalent and opens on to new horizons of meaning by short-
circuiting accepted codes and ways of looking. This production of knowledge is de-
pendent on interactive experience- a fluid movement between the viewer's feelings, 
thoughts and the art object within given social context. Sutherland and Acord de-
scribe this as "thinking with art"; they suggest rather that it gives rise to "experiential 
knowing" (Sutherland and Acord 2007: 125). _ 
The moment of practice implies testing to what degree experiential knowing that 
emerges from material processes corresponds to, or deviates from what we already 
know. It is in the heat of creative practice, the workings of material process orches-
trate what is laid down as an unconscious mark in a painting or a movement in dance. 
For this reason, artists themselves, and audiences are often bewildered by work that 
is "revolutionary". Kristeva draws on her experience in psychoanalysis to explain 
that the space of interpretation within creative practice, can be configured in terms 
of the space of psychoanalysis, where there is potential for a transfer of "knowl-
edge" between the artist as analysand and the work. In the process of interpretation 
the wqrk, or aesthetic image is itself posited as the "site" or figure of the analyst re-
flecting back to the artist perspectives or understandings of the world that may not 
have been available prior to the encounter. A similar relationship is set up between 
viewers and the artwork where the work of interpretation or "testing" proceeds as a 
creative practice in its own right. Through this process, the heterogeneous language 
of the artwork becomes the site of inter-subjective exchange predominantly con-
trolled by the structure of the artwork or aesthetic image. Interpretation and reflection 
permits the transfer of knowledge to be extended and applied in further practices 
that occur beyond the original site of making. This will be shown in the final part 
of this chapter in my discussion of specific case studies. Before proceeding, let us 
examine more closely, what is meant by "performativity" and how this concept is 
fundamental to articulating a rationale for creative arts research and for a revealing 
the limits of the scientific method. 
In his work How To Do Things With Words (1962), J.L. Austin identifies a class of 
utterances that he calls "performative". He explains that these utterances are un-
like what he calls "constative" utterances - those statements that are limited to de-
scribing phenomena. Performative utterances do not describe or report actions and 
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events, but actually perform the actions to which they refer. Austin uses the example 
of the words "I do", spoken in marriage ceremonies to illustrate this. Hence, his 
claim that in certain contexts making a statement of an action is equivalent to carry-
ing it out. Austin's framework suggests that, in some cases, there is no gap between 
language and the reality it represents. However it does not capture the idea of inven-
tive production that is implied in Julia I<risteva'a theory of creative textual practice. 
The user of language in Austin's account does not generate something new, but is a 
conscious ego who employs words that have socially agreed meanings. 
Brad Haseman draws on Austin thinking to make the following observation on 
creative practice as research: . 
When research findings are presented as performative utterances, there is 
a double articulation with practice that brings into being what, for want of 
another word, it names. (Haseman 2007: 150) 
Haseman's comment does suggest that performative utterances have the capaci-
ty to bring forth something new. However it draws some correspondence between 
artistic research and science in its implication of an unproblematic relationship be-
tween ready-made language and the complex processes of production that occur in 
creative practice. His observation, glosses over the issue of "naming", one that is at 
the heart of I<ristevan thinking on creative production and which recognizes that 
there is a gap between what language can describe or signify and reality. Art operates 
within this gap; this is what underscores I<risteva's critique of science. 
I<ristevan thought highlights material processes in creative practice as pre-linguistic 
and intra-linguistic processes. In her account, aesthetic processes occur in relation to both 
what is known and an as yet unsymbolized other (I<risteva 1984: 203). This leads to 
the conception of a more radically transgressive performativity: performativity as 
the bringing into view of the as yet unimaginable through the extension of language. 
It is only through the productive material alteration of language itself, or the forging 
of the aesthetic image- that this "unimaginable" may be accessed. What is signifi-
cant here is the idea that if we cannot consciously know an object without adequate 
symbols or language, there is a necessity to produce new forms of language in order 
to externalize our experiences or aesthetic encounters. This runs contrary to notions 
of performativity, either as a speech act, or as a citational practice emerging solely 
from an already constituted discourse. 
We can now assert that performativity in creative production involves an inter-
action between the subject (artist) as material process, as being and foeling- and the 
subject as signifyingprocess, as sense-making. This results in a renewal and alteration of 
both the subject and language. In the making and viewing of art, experience-in-
practice materializes or makes available to consciousness, a new object of knowl-
edge. Knowledge then, is not a static entity, but is what Ian Sutherland and Sophia 
I<rzys Acord describe as an interactive in situ encounter. This shifts our understand-
ing of knowledge from a passive to an active ingredient of social life. (Sutherland 
and Acord 2007: 126). 
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The two case studies to be discussed below will provide more concrete illustration 
of some the ideas presented here. 
Lucas lhlein, Blogging as Art 
Lucas Ihlein's recently completed PhD research, entitled Framing Everydqy Experi-
ence: Blogging as Art (2009), investigates the way in which the practice of blogging 
can be conceived as an art form, and as such is capable of deepening engagement 
and attention to everyday experience. Ihlein's research is influenced by the work of 
Kaprow who pioneered the participatory art form known as "Happenings" that ex-
plored the relationship between art and every day life. Though recognized as artisti-
cally innovative and politically significant, the interactive and participatory works of 
Kaprow and others such as the Situationists of the 1950s and 1960s were neverthe-
l'bss ephemeral staged events that are largely frozen within the time and place of their 
occurrence. One of the objectives of Ihlein's project, Btlateral Petersham, is to extend 
on, the practices of his antecedents by devising a method of recording and reflect-
ing on participatory art and his own art as everyday practice whilst at the same time 
maintaining the integrity and spontaneity of the process. Ihlein frames his research 
with the following questions: "If life and art can be successfully integrated what new 
knowledge might emerge in the process? How does the method of bilateral blogging 
work to produce aesthetic experience and new insights within the flow of everyday 
life?" (Ihlein 2009: 5-6). 
A requirement of the site-specific project was that the artist should remain within 
the boundaries of Petersham, a suburb of Sydney for two months and maintain a 
blog to record his everyday activities and interactions over that period. By devising a 
new way of making relational artworks and producing an experiential document of 
the particular environment in which the artwork is situated, Ihlein's project uncovers 
a new approach to understanding the functioning of aesthetic experience as an inte-
gral aspect of the research process. 
His method involves application of a spatial frame -the constraints of the specific 
site of the investigation; a temporal frame, the duration of the investigation and the 
synchronous unfolding of the blog, and a material/ technological frame - the hard-
ware and apparatus required to maintain the blog. These framing devices are used 
as a method to draw attention to the minutiae of daily life and to provide a record 
for further reflection, analysis and practice. The latter included an interactive gallery 
installation and the production visuals and a book of the blog narratives. Crucial to 
the project is the interactivity afforded by the blogging, which results in a performa-
tive and co-emergent production by the artist and other participants from the com-
munity. What emerges is not a simple recording or communication of events but a 
textured patina or impressionistic "portrait" of people places and events. lhlein's 
project demonstrates the aesthetic dimension of blogging uncovering aspects of 
Petersham that are not contained in institutional archives, maps and other institu-
tional records. His research also reveals how blogging can be used as a finely honed 
instrument for social research. < 
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Beyond articulating a form of practice that blurs the distinction between art and 
life, Lucas' reflections within the blog and the meta-reflection afforded by the exege-
sis produced insights and outcomes that have broader application and significance. 
For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus on one component of the project. A 
series of walks, which involved the artist's attempt to trace the boundaries of Peter-
sham by walking its borders. What emerges is an experiential and embodied map of 
the suburb disclosing the arbitrary nature of the lines on the official map. Ihlein ob-
serves that over the years, local council allocations of land and property deve16pment 
have carved up the terrain in ways that are alienating to human activity. He discovers 
that the official boundaries indicated on the official map pass through fenced off 
properties and tenements, cross railway lines and cut through inhospitable highways. 
At times this necessitates transgressing the imperative to remain strictly within the 
locale and these deviations reveal uncharted boundaries, interstices and connections. 
A recording of the experiences of the border walks and chance encounters along the 
way results in an aesthetic "remapping" of Petersham along experiential lines. Signif-
icantly, the spatial narratives produced from the walks reveal a different relationship 
to place: one of belonging rather than ownership of it. This insight is sharpened in 
an encounter with Aboriginal Elder Uncle Lester who recounts an alternative history 
of the occupation of Petersham. In Ihlein's own words, the resultant blog "creates 
a body of evidence that reclaims suburban space as having inherent value" (Ihlein 
2009: 109). Institutional rules and static entities such as lines on a map are constantly 
being written and re-written by actual behavior, experiences and activities of everyday 
life and in this way, experiential knowing transcends institutional knowledge. It is 
this polymorphous and unruly "knowing" born of experience, that art rather than 
science is able to reveal. 
Valerie Ingham, "Multimodal Research on the Fireground" 
The second case study to be discussed examines the broader application and signifi-
cance of how images function and how aesthetic awareness informs human behav-
ior and the capacity to innovate. Valerie Ingham lectures in Emergency Management 
at Charles Sturt University and is also a practising artist who presented reflections on 
her recently completed PhD research in a paper entitled "Multimodal Research on 
the Fireground" at the Deakin University Material Inventions: Appfying Creative Research 
Conference in December 2009. 
Ingham's research investigates the role of aesthetic awareness in time-pressured 
decision making of emergency workers such as fire fighters. Her work indicates that 
this form of awareness is crucial to decision-making and is the source of transgres-
sion from which innovative practice emerges. Her experience as an artist led her to 
connect two previously disparate fields in developing her research question: 
What is the relationship between risk perception, decision making and aesthet-
ic and somatic forms of awareness in Incident Controllers on the fireground? 
(Ingham 2009: 3) 
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The research involves interviewing fire fighters to examine their responses and 
decision-making during critical incidents. On the basis of collected data from inci-
dents Ingham develops the theory of multimodal decision-making, which suggests 
somatic awar~ness is simultaneous, holistic and inseparable from the ability to think 
rationally and make decisions. Those interviewed often observe that their actions 
and decisions are made intuitively and without consciously thinking. Ingham ob-
serves that there are some parallels between the experience of fire fighting and art 
practice: 
In the practice of an artist, spatial awareness may take the form of encompas-
sing multiple images with one sweeping glance, or a concerted 'look'; there is 
a sorting and comparison between patterns, objects and movement, some of 
which will appear in the image under construction and some which will not. 
This capacity to compare and sort elements of images in parallel, resulting 
in a selection and an understanding of contrast, I argue is comparable to the 
process of sizing-up for an Incident Controller. In size-up not only are visual 
pieces of information placed side by side and meanings ascertained, but con-
flicting verbal reports are also visualised and reviewed in instants of a second. 
(Ingham 2009: 6) 
The process of sizing up described here relates to the impact of matter and sen-
sation; flows of forces between human and non-human agents produce the aesthetic 
image that opens up new possibilities for action. In studio practice and within the 
heat of art-working, such action may involve finding the means to externalize, at 
least in part the internal mental image or the knowing it conveys. In this way, the 
structure of aesthetic image reveals new possibilities that exceed or transgress es-
tablished codes. 
Because incident controllers recount their experiences after the event, there is a 
tendency to use rational and ch:~pnological narrative to recount their experiences 
and actions. An objective of Ingham's research was to capture the multimodal and 
holistic essence of the scene in its entirety by engendering repeated and sustained 
reflection of the events through retelling. Understandings of arts-based practice 
emphasizing the artist as both practitioner-researcher and interpreter led to the de-
velopment of her multimodal research method. By placing the Incident Controllers 
in the position of artist-practitioner, she was able come closest to their first-hand 
view of the scene. 
Ingham argues that there are aspect~ of the recognition process which are non-
verbal and aesthetic in nature and which cannot be isolated or easily articulated. This 
underpins her views that aesthetics is vital to risk perception and decision making 
processes. Amongst incident controllers she interviewed, those with a greater level 
of aesthetic awareness, or who were able to forge situated and experiential aesthetic 
images - rather than relying on established procedures and codes - were most suc-
cessful in making decisions and arriving at unexpected and innovative responses. 
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In her account of one incident involving a fire at a glass factory, Ingham clearly 
articulates this: 
I suggest that what the Glass Factory Inspector sees is comparable to what 
Matisse saw when he looked at the seventeenth century Dutch still life painting 
by Jan Davidsz de Heem. Matisse did not see the photo-perfectionism, he was 
not sidetracked by the realism and he disregarded the traditional values and 
rules of representational painting. Instead he cut to the core, went straight to 
the stark outline of the incident and exposed the composition's true structure. /'> 
(Ingham 2009: 25) 
It can be suggested that Matisse was "struck" by the painting as if by a material ob-
ject. Similarly, for the Glass Factory inspector, confronted by the awesome splendor 
of 200 tons of molten glass, a kind of selective vision takes hold, one that focuses 
on the lines and the raw elements of the scene: this is the aesthetic image or the 
scene as it is felt. Undeterred by the heat and danger, the Factory Inspector discovers 
possibilities for action that have not been hitherto envisaged and "wants to go into 
action with a plan that nobody feels very motivated by - he wants the pump driver 
to forsake his safe post and get into the action where his skills will be put to greater 
use; in essence, the Inspector wants to break the 'rules"' (Ingham 2009: 25). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined Kristeva's concept of creativity as a mode of knowl-
edge production that is made possible through biological and material processes. 
What Kristeva has theorized as the materiality of language, allows us to conceive 
of heterogeneous subjectivity. In the context of creative practice as material process, 
there is a movement between human and non human elements and between what 
we may conceive of as the subject or knowing self (the socially constructed "I"), as 
opposed to the "I" that is articulated by drive or excitability. This process underpins 
the production of the aesthetic image and its relation to the "transgressive" dimen-
sion of creative practice. 
An understanding of I<risteva's account of materiality is essential to the critique 
of science presented here and to the notion of aesthetic experience as an alterna-
tive epistemology or ontology of knowledge. The focus on subjective processes 
elaborated through I<ristevan aesthetics, must also be understood in relation to the 
"agency" of materiality itse1f. Where traditional and Marxist accounts of materialism 
ultimately place consciousness at the center of the apprehension of reality, I<risteva's 
work acknowledges the agency of "brute" materiality or matter. In creative produc-
tion, there is no opposition between inside and outside: consciousness and materi-
ality are mutually constitutive, enfolded and emergent. It is in this sense that we can 
begin to speak of a "new materialism". 
